These documents are in Adobe® Portable Document Format (PDF) and require a copy of Adobe Reader® to view them. If you do not have a copy of Adobe Reader, you can download and install a free copy from Adobe.
Hidden, Smoky Fire in MD-87 Aft Cabin Forces Emergency Evacuation After Landing 8 pages. [PDF 115K]
All the passengers and crew members evacuated the aircraft at the gate without injury, but the fire would have posed a far greater safety threat if the fire had occurred in flight, the official Danish accident report said.
U.S. Air Force personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska knew that geese posed a danger to aircraft and acted to disperse them. Nevertheless, their efforts to detect or deter roosting geese were inadequate, an official U.S. Air Force accident report says.
After Loud Bang, Captain Rejects Takeoff; DC-10 Runs Off End of Runway 8 pages. [PDF 65K]
The accident raised crew-training issues and renewed concern about rejected takeoffs when runways are wet or contaminated by slush or snow, the official Canadian accident report said.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board investigators determined that the Turkish maintenance station that had last inspected the compressor disk had overlooked a detectable flaw that caused the disk to fragment.
The approach controller did not warn the crew of the possibility of wind shear, but the official Portuguese accident report noted that such an experienced crew should have been aware that wind shear was a possibility.
Racing Balloon Is Shot Down by Air Force Attack Helicopter in Belarus 8 pages. [PDF 59K]
The balloon crew may have been suffering from the combined effects of hypoxia and fatigue and, therefore, failed to react to the sounds of the helicopter and machine-gun fire, the official report said.
The operator of the accident aircraft failed to provide adequate quality control and oversight of the installation of special-mission power wiring for military use of the aircraft, the official U.S. report said.
Although the flight was legal under the regulations governing it, the accident flight crew would not have met the legal crew-rest requirements for a revenue flight, the official U.S. report said.
The airline failed to obtain the captain’s training records from his previous employer, where he had received negative evaluations. The records were also inadequate for assessing flight proficiency, the official investigation found.
On the night of the accident, the ground controller in the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control tower was working four positions and monitoring seven frequencies, the official U.S. report said.
The approach was continued into severe convective activity and the crew failed to recognize a wind-shear situation in a timely manner. The failure of the air traffic controller to report radar data and other pertinent weather information to the crew was a contributing factor to the accident, the official U.S. report said.
The official report of the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board concluded that the original design of the engine pylons, together with the continuous airworthiness measures and the associated inspection system, did not guarantee the minimum required level of safety of the Boeing 747 at the time of the accident.