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MD-88 Strikes Approach Light Structure in Nonfatal Accident 16 pages. [PDF 204K]
The collision occurred on a daylight, visual approach over water to Runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport, New York, New York, U.S., when visual illusions and the pilot’s monovision contact lenses caused him to misperceive the aircraft’s altitude and rate of descent, the report said.
The cockpit crew had no means to extinguish or suppress the fire because the cargo compartment was not equipped (nor was it required to be equipped) with a fire extinguisher, the official report said.
The crew lost control of the aircraft, which collided with terrain. The crew’s disregard of minimum descent altitude on the nonprecision step-down approach caused the accident.
Contributing factors included the pilots’ unfamiliarity with an actual DC-8 stall, the test flight at night without a visual horizon and an engine-compressor stall that might have distracted the flight crew at a critical time.
On their approach to Cali, Colombia, the flight crew selected a direct course to the ROMEO nondirectional beacon (NDB), believing that they were selecting the ROZO NDB. According to the Colombia Aeronautica Civil accident investigation report, the incorrect flight management system entry led the airplane to turn toward Bogota, Colombia, which was 212 kilometers (132 miles) to the northeast.
According to the official U.S. accident report, failure of the cockpit voice recorder to retain conversations during the initial approach, landing and go-around impeded the investigation.
Flight Crew’s Failure to Perform Landing Checklist Results in DC-9 Wheels-up Landing 16 pages. [PDF 287K]
The captain ignored several cues that the unstabilized approach should have been aborted. These included excessive airspeed, an alert from the ground-proximity warning system, lack of green lights signaling that the landing gear was down and locked, and the sounding of the gear-warning horn.
Passengers were commanded to remove their shoes before evacuating the aircraft, which slowed the evacuation and could have caused injuries or loss of life in a fire or other critical situation, the official U.S. accident investigation report said.
Captain Rejects Takeoff as Boeing 747 Veers off Slippery Runway 12 pages. [PDF 208K]
The airline’s flight attendant procedures did not provide adequate guidance to flight attendants on how to coordinate their actions during and after the impact sequence, the official U.S. report said.
After receiving second-degree burns to her ankles and legs in the postaccident fire, the flight attendant continued to assist passengers by moving them away from the airplane and extinguished flames on at least one passenger who was on fire, the official U.S. report said.
Learjet MEDEVAC Flight Ends in Controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) 8 pages. [PDF 68K]
The Canadian accident-investigation board determined that the flight crew had apparently mis-set one or both altimeters, resulting in lower-than-prescribed altitudes for the descent profile. The flight crew and medical-team passengers were killed when the Learjet was unknowingly flown into the water.