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Although there were only minor injuries in the evacuation, the evacuation was delayed by the flight crew’s failure to depressurize the aircraft. Investigators were unable to determine the fire’s ignition source but found evidence of undeclared hazardous cargo.
MD-83 Crew Continues Flight Operations with Suspected Engine Malfunction 12 pages. [PDF 162K]
The Finnish Accident Investigation Board said that the flight crew heard unusual noises from the left engine and observed abnormal left-engine instrument indications. Nevertheless, the crew did not have the engine examined properly between two flights. The crew then rejected a takeoff when the left engine failed to accelerate because of substantial compressor-section damage.
The cargo was not loaded aboard the airplane according to the airline’s instructions. As a result, the flight crew inadvertently used a horizontal-stabilizer-trim setting that was not correct for the airplane’s aft center of gravity.
The flight crew shut down the left engine after the aircraft struck an eagle. They continued flying near the destination airport for 31 minutes while troubleshooting a landing-gear-unsafe warning. The crew then lost directional control of the aircraft during an attempted single-engine, crosswind landing.
The aircraft was substantially damaged when it collided with a snowbank during the rejected takeoff, but there were no serious injuries. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said that inadequate training of the flight crew and the captain’s improper decision to reject the takeoff after the aircraft had reached takeoff-decision speed were the probable causes of the accident.
Operations and Maintenance Audit Failures Cited as Factors in Two Fatal Accidents 12 pages. [PDF 130K]
The New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission said that Civil Aviation Authority audits of two commercial operators failed to detect and/or correct conditions that might have contributed to a de Havilland Canada Dash 8 controlled-flight-into-terrain accident and a Beechcraft Baron 58 loss-of-control accident.
Fluid leaking from the cabin onto the yaw-damper coupler in the electronic-and-equipment bay affected electronic signals transmitted to the yaw-damper actuator and caused a dutch-roll oscillation.
The B-737 pilot correctly read back an ATC clearance, but set the wrong flight level in the autopilot mode control panel. Separation between the B-737 and a McDonnell Douglas MD-81 in the same holding stack was reduced to less than one-half mile (0.8 kilometer) horizontally and 100 feet (30.5 meters) vertically at their closest.
MD-88 Has Uncontained Engine Failure on Takeoff Roll Following Fan-hub Fracture 16 pages. [PDF 244K]
A defect in the fan hub was not detected by blue-etch anodize inspection following manufacture, nor was the resulting fatigue crack detected in a fluorescent penetrant inspection during maintenance at the airline facility.
Boeing 767 Descends Below Glide Path, Strikes Tail on Landing 8 pages. [PDF 81K]
The flight crew responded to a visual illusion with an unwarranted power reduction, said the official accident investigation report. Just before landing, the aircraft’s pitch attitude increased; the tail skid struck the runway surface as the aircraft landed.
All the occupants of the Beechcraft 1900C and the Beechcraft King Air A90 died from the inhalation of smoke, soot or other products of combustion in the postaccident fire that consumed both aircraft.